Consumer Advocate Releases Ideas for 2025 Legislation

The Residential Ratepayers Advisory Board (RRAB), which serves pursuant to RSA 363:28-a as an official sounding board for the Office of the Consumer Advocate, has asked the OCA to present the Board with a list of potential ideas for the session of the New Hampshire General Court that will begin in January 2025.  Acccordingly, Consumer Advocate Donald Kreis has prepared and circulated the memorandum below, outlining nine specific ideas.  The memorandum will be the centerpiece of the RRAB's next meeting, with takes place on Monday, October 21 at 2:00 p.m. in Hearing Room B at the N.H. Department of Energy (21 S. Fruit Street in Concord).  The meeting is open to the public.

October 11, 2025

MEMORANDUM TO:        Residential Ratepayers Advisory Board

FROM:                                  Donald M. Kreis, Consumer Advocate

SUBJECT:                             Legislative Proposals for Discussion at 10/21/2024 RRAB Meeting

As reflected in the discussion at the July meeting of the Residential Ratepayers Advisory Board (“RRAB” or “Board”), there is renewed interest in leaning into the Board’s advisory role.  Therefore, as an experiment, rather than inviting an outside speaker to the October 21 RRAB meeting as has been customary in recent years, after consulting with Chairman Moses and Vice Chairman Nute I have drafted this memorandum in an effort to tee up potential legislative proposals for the OCA to consider presenting to the General Court during its 2025 session.

1.         Strengthen the Electric Assistance Program (“EAP”)

The relevant sections of the Electric Utility Restructuring Act – RSA 374-F:3, VI-a(a)(6) and RSA 374-F:4, VIII(c) – authorize the Public Utilities Commission (“PUC” or “Commission”) to fund an assistance program for low-income customers via the non-bypassable System Benefits Charge (“SBC”) that appears on all electric bills.  The latter provision states that the portion of the SBC used for what has come to be known as the EAP (Electric Assistance Program) may not exceed 1.5 mills (0.15 cents or $0.0015) per kilowatt-hour.  Further, if the Commission “determines that the low-income program fund has accumulated an excess of $1,000,000 and that the excess is not likely to be substantially reduced over the next 12 months, it shall suspend collection of some or all of this portion of the system benefits charge for a period of time it deems reasonable.”  In 2022 the General Court added language stating that the PUC could not impose such a suspension before June 30, 2024.

In recent years the Commission has proven itself skeptical if not hostile to the EAP, at least as it is presently designed.  The most notable recent example is Order No. 27,031, issued in July.  The Commission ordered the utilities (1) to replace the mechanism they had adopted for allowing eligible customers not taking default energy service to participate in the EAP, (2) to reduce delinquencies among EAP participants (presumably by throwing participants out of the program), and (3) to revisit Tier 6 (the highest level discount) because “there is currently no time limit to the program, and at an 86 percent discount, there is a significant financial incentive to remain in the program,” to “pare back” the eligibility for Tier 2 (the smallest discount available).  The parties to the relevant proceeding, including the OCA, moved for rehearing on the final point (concerning Tier 2 eligibility, noting that it reflected a misunderstanding of the recommendations of the Department of Energy’s expert.  The Commission grudgingly granted rehearing, determining there would be “benefit in further development of the record relating to Tier 2 eligibility and program spending, without ceding any specific point presented the Moving Parties' joint position in advance.”

The problem for the General Court to address is the PUC’s insistence on substituting its judgment on program administration for that of the EAP Advisory Board, which has existed since the mid-1990s and which, prior to the current administration of the PUC, governed the programs via the consensus of the Department of Energy (formerly, the PUC Staff), the OCA, New Hampshire Legal Assistance, the state’s Community Action Agencies (which determine program eligibility), and the utilities.  An appropriate legislative fix would be a bill that (1) transfers the authority for the EAP to the Department of Energy, (2) enshrines the EAP Advisory Board in statute as a body that advises the Department, and (3) provides, at a minimum, for inflation-adjustment of the nonbypassable 1.5 mill/kwh charge.  An alternative idea would be to enshrine the EAP Advisory Board in statute (along with its present members, including the OCA and the Department), require the Department’s representative to chair the Advisory Board, and specify that any questions about which there is not consensus among Advisory Board members can be submitted to the PUC for it to resolve after hearing.

2.         Authorize the OCA to Participate in Site Evaluation Committee Proceedings

On September 23 the Site Evaluation Committee (“SEC”) – the agency that decides whether major energy projects in the state should go forward – unanimously rejected the OCA’s petition to intervene in a proceeding that concerns a $400 million transmission rebuild project from Eversource.  Eversource successfully relied upon (1) language in the OCA enabling statute (RSA 363:28) authorizing the Consumer Advocate to appear before any tribunal in any proceeding “concerning rates, charges, tariffs, and consumer services,” arguing that an SEC docket does not concern any of these things, (2) language in the SEC’s enabling statute enumerating the questions the SEC must consider, none of which explicitly reference ratepayer impacts.

Eversource’s plan to rebuild the X-178 line is a paradigm example of why OCA participation in SEC proceedings is appropriate.  The project will have relatively few direct land-use impacts; it is, after all, a reconstruction of an existing transmission line in a well-established corridor that has existed for many decades.  FERC – particularly Commissioner Mark Christie, formerly a member of Virginia’s utility commission – has made plain its expectation that state authorities must be the first line of defense against transmission projects that are inconsistent with state-law policy requirements (even though the Federal Power Act tasks FERC with regulating transmission rates – authority that really ought to include the review of projects for prudence, the same standard the PUC applies to expenditures at distribution voltage, and even though FERC has “backstop” authority with respect to siting transmission lines themselves).  The Federal Power Act gives FERC no role whatsoever in determining where and what generation facilities are constructed – that is entirely a matter left to state authorities.

We believe it would be appropriate to (1) amend the relevant language in the OCA enabling statute to state that the consumer advocate “shall have the power and duty to petition for, initiate, appear or intervene in any proceeding concerning rates, charges, tariffs, facilities, and consumer services before any board, commission, agency court or regulatory body in which the interests of residential utility consumers are involved and to represent the interests of such residential utility customers,” and (2) revise RSA 162-H:7-a, III to read as follows:

Within 30 days of receipt of a notification of proceeding, a state agency not having permitting or other regulatory authority but wishing to participate in the proceeding shall advise the presiding officer of the committee in writing of such desire and be allowed to do so provided that the presiding officer determines that a material interest in the proceeding is demonstrated and such participation conforms with the normal procedural rules of the committee.  For purposes of this paragraph, a material interest includes but is not limited to the interests represented by the consumer advocate pursuant to RSA 363:28, II.

3.  Clarify the authority of both the PUC and the Department of Energy

When the General Court created the Department of Energy and down-sized the Public Utilities Commission via the budget trailer bill in 2021, the purpose (in broad terms) was to make the Department the state’s “policy shop” with respect to issues related to regulated utilities and confine the PUC to a strictly adjudicative role in circumstances (including but not limited to rate proceedings) where competing interests (typically but not exclusively shareholder and ratepayer interests) would need to be reconciled.  Unfortunately, this is not how these two agencies have been operating.

In our experience, the Department has been cautious and reticent about policy positions and, conversely, the PUC has been muscular in pursuing a policy agenda.  We believe that remedial legislation could be helpful in directing each agency toward fulfillment of its intended role.

The salient provision from the enabling statute of the Department of Energy, RSA 12-P:2, II, states that the purpose of the statute is to “improve the administration of state government by providing unified direction of policies, programs, and personnel in the field of energy and utilities, making possible increased efficiency and economies from integrated administration and operation of the various energy and utility related functions of the state government.”  (Emphasis added.)  This cannot be improved upon:  What is required is “direction” – i.e., leadership – and that leadership is not shared but “unified” in the Department without any role carved out for the PUC. 

Paragraph IV of this provision vests in the Department “the authority to investigate any matter that may come before the public utilities commission and to appear before the commission to advocate for the department's position and for the purposes of providing a complete record for consideration by the commission.”  It makes sense to vest in the Department, given its policy development role, something of a prosectorial function alongside the plenary access to the books and records of utilities as has been traditionally vested in the Commission.

In other words, it appears that the problem – i.e., the lack of clarity – arises out of ambiguities remaining in the PUC’s enabling statutes.  The budget trailer bill language adopted in 2021 was developed in haste; the General Court was hesitant to repeal or otherwise tinker with the statutes governing the pre-existing agency.  It is time to address the resulting problems head-on.

Therefore we are considering a request to have a bill introduced that would:

• Add a new provision, RSA 363:1-a, after RSA 363:1 (specifying that there shall be a PUC consisting of three commissioners serving six-year terms, etc.), reading:  “The authority of the Commission shall consist in conducting contested adjudicative proceedings within the meaning of RSA 541-A:31 on matters concerning the rates, charges, tariffs, and services provided by public utilities as defined in RSA 362:2 and others as specifically authorized under this title, and to adopt administrative rules consistent with its authority as provided in this title.”
• Amend RSA 365:6 and :7 to limit the right of utility inspection to the Department, rather than both the Department and the PUC.
• Repeal RSA 365:19, which presently authorizes the Commission, in any case in which the agency may hold a hearing, to “make such independent investigation as in its judgment the public good may require.”  The Commission has been abusing this authority by using the provision as a pretext for turning contested adjudicative proceedings into unpredictable free-for-alls.
• Amend RSA 374:3, which concerns “the general supervision of all public utilities” and their facilities, to limit this authority to the Department rather than, as at present, the Department and the PUC concurrently.
• Amend RSA 374:4 to provide that the duty to keep informed specified therein is vested solely in the Department.  Add a new paragraph to read as follows: “II.  The commission shall have the duty to keep informed as to all public utilities in the state consistent with the requirements of paragraph I, but the commission shall not have independent authority to investigate compliance by such public utilities.”   (RSA 365:4 already authorizes the Department, after an investigation, to institute proceedings before the PUC to satisfy the complaint if necessary; this provision also allows anyone (including the OCA) to make complaints to the Department and, if not satisfied, to trigger adjudicative proceedings before the Commission via petition).
• Amend RSA 374:5, which covers “additions and improvements” (to utility facilities), to limit the authority specified therein to the Department. 
• Amend RSA 374:7, presently authorizing both the Commission and the Department to “investigate and ascertain . . . the quality of gas supplied by public utilities and the methods employed by public utilities,” so that the investigative authority reposes solely in the Department while retaining the stated power for the Commission to order “improvements and extensions in service or methods” after notice and hearing.
• Amend RSA 374:18, concerning a requirement that a utility produce its books and records upon demand, so that the authority reposes solely in the Department and not the Commission.
• Add a new statute, RSA 365:20-a, to read as follows:  “Settlements.  In any proceeding to which the department of energy and the office of the consumer advocate are parties, the commission shall approve by order any settlement agreement to which all parties are signatory, unless the commission determines that any settlement provision is contrary to law.”

The last provision above would have the effect of limiting the Commission’s power to override the policy judgments of the Department.  Requiring the approval of the OCA for such automatic approval of settlement agreements would operate as a check on the Department’s policy judgments.

A different approach to solving the problem addressed by the above-referenced changes would be to unwind the 2021 legislation creating the Department of Energy altogether, folding its functions back into the PUC and restoring the status quo ante of a PUC that is both a “decider” and the policymaker. 

4.  Subject All Default Energy Service Procurement and Rates to PUC Approval

Under the relevant provision of the Electric Utility Restructuring Act, RSA 374-F:2, I-a,  “default service” (commonly referred to be Eversource as “default energy service”) is “electricity supply that is available to retail customers who are otherwise without an electricity supplier and . . . is provided by electric distribution utilities under RSA 374-F:3, V or as an alternative, by municipal or county aggregators under RSA 53-E.” RSA 374-F:3, V(c), in turn, states that “[d]efault service should be designed to provide a safety net and to assure universal access and system integrity.  Default service should be procured through the competitive market and may be administered by independent third parties.”

Whatever the thinking was in 1996, when most of this language was first adopted, it is now clear that purchasing default energy service – either from the customer’s distribution utility or via a community power aggregation program adopted by the customer’s municipality – is the only viable opportunity for residential customers to buy electricity at a good price and on good terms.  Competitive suppliers have ill-served residential customers by preying upon the gullible and the vulnerable and by deploying teaser rates along with similar tactics to extract too much money from customers.

Currently, the PUC directs, reviews, and approves the methods by which Eversource, Liberty, and Unitil acquire default energy service at wholesale and then price the service at retail.  In the interest of maintaining a level playing field and assuring that all customers receive the protections they deserve, we believe it is time to subject all default service offerings – including those of the Community Power Coalition of New Hampshire (CPCNH), other aggregation programs, and the New Hampshire Electric Cooperative – to PUC approval.  We are concerned about the CPCNH in particular, given that it is in the process of expanding its footprint to more than 60 municipalities and may, in the near future, become the largest supplier of default energy service in the state.

A different approach to this problem would be to attempt a comprehensive re-write of the Restructuring Act.  RSA 374-F, initially adopted in 1996, was drafted as a blueprint for transforming vertically integrated electric utilities into companies exclusively concerned with poles and wires.  The transformation was fully complete in 2018 and the statutory scheme is now ill-suited to a legal paradigm that has become (more or less) static.

5.  Expiration of Certificates of Deregulation for New Hampshire Electric Cooperative

Twenty-four years ago, taking advantage of newly adopted legislation (RSA 301:57), the New Hampshire Electric Cooperative filed a “certificate of deregulation” with the PUC, which had the effect of exempting the Co-op from nearly all oversight by the Commission.  RSA 301:57, I provides that a cooperatively organized electric utility can file such a certificate if at least 60 percent of the voting members (i.e., customers) agree to such deregulation.  Paragraph II of the statute provides that the Co-op’s membership may, after five years, similarly vote to re-regulate themselves.

Recently the Co-op has been beset by internal controversy.  Two women who were previously the board’s leaders resigned their positions rather noisily, claiming they had been the victims of sexism and bullying.  The newly elected (male) chair of the Co-op’s board regards himself as an expert on wholesale energy procurement and seems keen on substituting his judgment for that of the Co-op’s portfolio managers.  (Here it is worth pausing to note that the Co-op’s default energy service, which the utility refers to as “Co-op Power,” has historically been cheaper than that of the utilities – and the Co-op’s former wholesale portfolio manager, Brian Callnan, left the Co-op to become CEO of the CPCNH which has likewise been beating the utilities on default energy service pricing.  However, it is reasonable to infer that the Co-op’s superior track record is properly attributed to the lack of PUC oversight, which freed the Co-op to employ more creative procurement strategies than allowed by the PUC to the investor-owned utilities.)

Nationally, there is a variety of approaches to regulating what are officially known as rural electric cooperatives.  In some states, e.g., Vermont, they are as fully regulated as any utility.  In others they are subject to essentially no regulation, the theory being that when the owners of the utility and the customers of the utility are the same people, the justification for regulation disappears.  Still other states have adopted a hybrid approach.

Because I have been active in the cooperative world myself (I chaired the Board of the nation’s second largest cooperative grocer, as well as the board of a community development financial institution that lends money to cooperatives) I have thought long and hard about how much oversight the NHEC truly needs if its ratepayers are to receive the protection they deserve.  The premise of regulation being unnecessary is that the governance mechanisms of the cooperative give the customers the power and influence they lack at investor-owned utilities.  But there are reasons to worry that at the NHEC these mechanisms are not functioning as well as they should.

In my view, the answer is to require periodic membership votes to renew a certificate of deregulation that has previously been filed with the PUC.  Therefore I propose replacing paragraph II of RSA 301:57 (the provision that allows members to vote to re-regulate after five years) with language that reads as follows:

II.  A certificate of deregulation duly approved by the membership of a rural electric cooperative, and filed with the Public Utilities Commission, shall expire on the fifth anniversary of its adoption by the membership.  During the fifth year of the effectiveness of a certificate of deregulation, or thereafter, a rural electric cooperative may again elect to become exempt from regulation by the Commission for a subsequent five year period pursuant to paragraph I.  A rural electric cooperative whose certificate of deregulation has expired shall file a certificate of regulation with the commission as required by paragraph III. 

It is quite likely that the members of the NHEC would continue to opt for deregulation upon expiration of a certificate, if only because the Co-op itself would typically urge such a result on its members.  Nevertheless, requiring periodic reexamination of whether to reregulate would make the New Hampshire Electric Cooperative more accountable to its members and, generally, foster robust public discussion of the extent to which this customer-owned utility is living up to its ideals.

6.  Fix PUC Rulemaking Authority

Theoretically, independent executive branch regulatory tribunals like the PUC are supposed to make decisions two ways:  by adjudicating cases and by adopting rules.  Adjudication is for matters involving specific parties (e.g., a particular utility’s rate case) whereas rules involve requirements that apply across the board, such as how all utilities will impose disconnections or how they will interconnect distributed generation or what they must include in a rate case filing.  (Our PUC has a longstanding practice of inventing a third type of decisionmaking – i.e., generic dockets that aren’t really adjudicative and that apply to whole industries but without going through the formalities of rulemaking – but that’s not important for present purposes.) 

Unfortunately, one consequence of the hasty process (via the budget trailer bill at the conclusion of a frantic legislative session in 2021) that led to the creation of the Department of Energy is that the authority to promulgate PUC rules was transferred from the commission generally (i.e., all three commissioners) to the chairman exclusively.  This was accomplished via adding this sentence to RSA 363:1 (the statute that formally establishes the PUC):  “The chair of the commission shall have the powers and duties set forth in RSA 21-G:9.”  It turns out that one of the “powers and duties set forth in RSA 21-G:9,” which describes what commissioners of cabinet-level agencies do, is the authority to promulgate rules.

Although I believe the person who drafted this language and caused it to be inserted into the budget trailer bill was fully aware of what she was doing, I do not believe the General Court truly intended to divest two of the three PUC commissioners of their authority with respect to so fundamental a task as adopting rules.  This problem is amenable to surgical correction, perhaps by rewriting the sentence quoted above to read:  “The chair of the commission shall have the powers and duties set forth in RSA 21-G:9 except for the authority to promulgate rules, which shall be adopted by majority vote of the commissioners.”

7.  Study the “Distribution System Operator” Concept

Pursuant to a bill enacted in 2023, our neighbors in Maine are in the midst of a study to determine whether a Distribution System Operator (“DSO”) could be established in Maine to achieve cost savings for customers and improve system reliability.  The Governor’s Energy Office is tasked with this job in Maine; in New Hampshire the corresponding agency is the Department of Energy.

New Hampshire should consider adopting a similar bill, timed to take advantage of the findings and recommendations developed in Maine.

A DSO basically functions at the retail, distribution voltage level the way a regional transmission organization (i.e., ISO New England) functions at the wholesale and transmission voltage level.  In essence, a DSO would become the platform for people to trade electricity at distribution voltage, without having to buy and sell via ISO New England.  As broadly conceived via the Maine legislation, a DSO would be designed to oversee integrated system planning and actually operate the distribution system across the state.  One stated purpose of the DSO in the Maine legislation is to facilitate the achievement of that state’s greenhouse gas reduction obligations.  In New Hampshire I would recommend a focus on what I have come to describe as more “agency” for customers – basically, more freedom to buy, sell, and produce electricity.

8.  Authorize a Regional Utility Customer Data Platform

It has been five years since the OCA led the effort to persuade the General Court to endorse the development of a statewide online utility customer data platform – not merely to facilitate electric and gas customers gaining access to their usage data but, more critically, to allow customers to share their usage data conveniently with third parties.  These third parties, in turn, can provide services to customers that will allow them to save money via everything from energy efficiency to distributed generation and energy management.

The statute endorsing this effort is codified as sections 50 through 54 of RSA 378.  Section 51 of the statute required the PUC to open an adjudicative proceeding in late 2019 to establish the parameters for the platform.  The Commission did so – via Docket No. DE 19-197 – and the investor-owned utilities surprised me by working in good faith to develop a roadmap for the design and creation of the platform, which the PUC approved in March of 2022.  The salient features are: (1) reliance on a technological approach described as an “API of APIs,” (API standing for “application programming interface”) that preserves the integrity of the back-end system of each participating utility, and (2) a consensus-based governance council to assure that the utilities, as the owners and operators of the platform, cannot build or run the platform in a manner that is objectionable to non-utility stakeholders (including the OCA, which is represented on the governance council).

As work proceeds in the wake of the PUC’s conceptional approval, the Commission has cast itself in the role of uber-overseer of the project.  This is, perhaps, an over-extension of the regulator’s role.  As I imagined it – and I was directly involved in the drafting of the statute – the PUC would use DE 19-197 to extract cooperation from the utilities, but would then treat the development of the platform as a garden variety utility capital project (i.e., one that would not require explicit PUC approval as to its design and construction).  However, as the basis for reviewing the project’s development much as a utility’s board or senior management might, the PUC has relied on paragraph III of RSA 378:51, which states that the Department shall “defer” development of the platform “if the commission determines that the cost of such platform to be recovered from customers is unreasonable and not in the public interest.”

Our effort during the 2023 legislative session to clarify and thus limit the Commission’s role was not successful.  I do not propose taking another run at this effort.  However, events have overtaken the original efforts in DE 19-197 somewhat, thanks to the availability of federal assistance via the bipartisan Infrastructure Act adopted by Congress three years ago.  The Governance Council voted to pursue a grant via one of the programs of the Infrastructure Act – the Grid Resilience and Innovation Partnerships (“GRIP”) program, administered by the federal Department of Energy (DOE).  In the process of developing the grant proposal the Governance Council learned that the DOE favors regional programs over those limited to one state.  So, the Governance Council reached out to utilities and other stakeholders in neighboring states, the result being an application for a GRIP grant covering a regional utility customer data platform.  A decision from the GRIP program is expected in the very near future.

We are concerned that the PUC may not be as enthusiastic about a regional data platform as the data platform Governance Council is.  From a legal perspective, I am concerned that the Commission could deem itself constrained by the lack of any reference in the statute to a multi-state platform.  Therefore I propose amending the statute to allow for such an expansion of the data platform – something that would be fully consistent with the original concept as it was discussed among the OCA and other interested stakeholders dating back to at least 2017.  

Therefore, I would add a new paragraph to RSA 378:51 so that it reads as follows:

378:51 Online Energy Data Platform Established. –
I. The department of energy shall require electric and natural gas utilities to establish and jointly operate a statewide, multi-use, online energy data platform. The data platform shall:
(a) Consist of a common base of energy data for use in wide range of applications and business uses.
(b) Adhere to specific and well-documented standards.
(c) Provide a user-friendly interface.
(d) Adhere to a common statewide logical data model that defines the relationships among the various categories of data included in the platform.
(e) Allow for sharing of individual customer data consistent with the opt-in requirements for third-party access specified in RSA 363:38.
(f) Protect from unauthorized disclosure the personally identifying information of utility customers in a manner that advances applicable constitutional and statutory privacy rights, including the protections of RSA 363:38.
(g) Provide for the voluntary participation of municipal utilities and deregulated rural electric cooperatives in data sharing and the operation of the online energy data platform, subject to terms, conditions, and cost sharing which are reasonable and in the public interest.

II.  A multi-use, online energy data platform created and operated on a regional, multi-state basis shall be deemed to be consistent with the requirements of this subdivision provided that it is available on a statewide basis in New Hampshire, does not allocate an unreasonable share of costs to New Hampshire customers, and is otherwise consistent with the standards and principles enumerated in this subdivision.
 

9.  Performance-Based Regulation

Finally, there is the possibility of opposing, or at least discouraging, legislation we expect to be introduced on the subject of PBR – performance-based regulation.

Over the last several decades, there has been ongoing concern about the adequacy of the traditional “cost-of-service” method regulators use to determine rates for public utilities.  This traditional method involves, in essence, figuring out how much revenue a utility needs over the course of a year, to cover both operating costs and a reasonable return on capital investments, and then dividing up that revenue requirement among the various rate classes in (hopefully) an equitable manner.  From a ratepayer perspective, the traditional method rewards inefficiency and actually encourages utilities to invest in assets they may not need.  From a utility perspective, the traditional method is too backward-looking – the minute the regulator determines a new revenue requirement it becomes outdated and inadequate as the utility makes new investment, inflation takes its toll, etc.

Thus, some analysts are drawn to the idea of tying rate changes – particularly rate increases – not to shifts in revenue requirements but, rather, to the achievement of performance benchmarks.  Examples include the number and duration of outages, the interconnection of distributed generation, customer satisfaction, affordability, and adoption of energy efficiency measures.

New Hampshire law already authorizes PBR.  See RSA 374:3-a (“the public utilities commission may approve alternative forms of regulation other than the traditional methods which are based upon cost of service, rate base and rate of return, provided that any such alternative results in just and reasonable rates and provides the utility the opportunity to realize a reasonable return on its investment”).  Eversource has made an elaborate (although, at this stage, highly self-serving) PBR proposal in its pending rate case, responding to previous indications in Commission orders that it take such a step.  Likewise, Liberty Utilities proposed a PBR plan last year in its failed rate proceeding (soon, we hope, to be settled in the wake of the Department of Energy’s effort to dismiss the proceeding altogether).  Clearly, both utilities and regulators in New Hampshire are interested in PBR – as is the Office of the Consumer Advocate.

In these circumstances, we believe the better course of action is to see what results are obtained via the Eversource rate case, which will be concluded well in advance of the 2026 legislative session.

Conclusion

The above nine legislative ideas reflect my current thinking as of the date of this memorandum.  We will not necessarily pursue all of these ideas, and new ones may emerge as the 2025 legislative session approaches and, then, proceeds.  Though the outcome of the election that is now a few weeks away will have a major impact on what we pursue and how we pursue it, we are looking forward to working with the new Governor and the new Legislature. The Board’s next meeting, in January, will be a timely occasion for assessing those bills that others introduce and discussing how the OCA might respond to them.

Please do not hesitate to reach out with any questions or concerns about the foregoing.